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Abstract: The 2008-09 crisis has shown that some euro area member countries were unable to sufficiently 
stabilize their economies which has given rise to a debate about deeper fiscal integration in Europe. In this 
paper, we analyze the redistributive and stabilizing effects of two scenarios of fiscal integration in the 
Eurozone, namely the introduction of  i) a joint tax and transfer system that replaces 10 per cent of national 
systems and ii) a system of fiscal equalization that equalizes 10 per cent of differences in taxing capacity. 
Based on the European tax-benefit calculator EUROMOD and representative household micro data for the 
current 17 euro area member states, our conceptual experiment shows that a joint tax and transfer system 
would only lead to moderate gains in terms of stabilization while redistribution would flow especially 
towards the Eastern European member states. In contrast, a fiscal equalization mechanism that redistributes 
revenues across countries could even lead to destabilizing effects.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The debt crisis in Europe initiated a debate about deeper fiscal integration in the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU). The 2008-09 economic crisis has shown that some euro area (EA)
1 member states were unable to sufficiently stabilize their economies. This was especially true for some 
Southern European countries where limited access to private credit markets even led to destabilizing effects 
due to statutory tax increases and benefit cuts (see e.g. Bertola 2013).  
In the current policy debate in Europe, the view is widespread that the European currency union will not 
survive unless it is complemented by a ‘fiscal union’. Options discussed range from enforced budget rules to 
the development of an own ‘fiscal capacity’ for the EMU. In October 2012, the President of the European 
Council, Herman van Rompuy, argued: “Strengthening discipline alone is … not sufficient. In the longer 
term, there is a need to explore the option to go beyond the current steps to strengthen economic governance 
by developing gradually a fiscal capacity for the EMU. Such a fiscal capacity could take several forms and 
various options would need to be explored”.2 Subsequently, EU Commissioner László Andor suggested an 
EU level unemployment insurance scheme that could be introduced complementary to the national 
unemployment benefit systems.3 Shortly after this, the European Commission built upon these initiatives 
when launching its official report entitled “A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary union 
- Launching a European Debate” (European Commission 2012). 
Since then, the perspectives of a European fiscal union have been discussed in various studies (see e.g. 
Allard et al. 2013, Dullien 2013, Enderlein et al. 2013). Besides, the question of how to optimally design a 
(European) fiscal union has also gained renewed interest in the  more theoretical literature (see e.g. Drèze and 
Durré 2013, Engler and Voigts 2013, Evers 2012, Farhi and Werning 2012).4 These proposals and studies 
indicate an even more intense debate about fiscal integration in Europe in the future and show that a possible 
fiscal stabilization mechanism might even include elements of a joint tax and transfer system. This would 
imply that fiscal institutions in the Eurozone would become more similar to those of existing federations such 
as the US. While the main argument in favor of integrated fiscal mechanisms in the EMU is that they should 
act as insurance devices in the presence of asymmetric macroeconomic shocks, the main concern in the 
debate relates to possible permanent transfers across member countries. 
In this paper, we go one step further and set up a conceptual experiment in which we analyze the 
redistributive and stabilizing effects of two more general scenarios of fiscal integration in the Eurozone, 
namely first, an EMU-wide tax and transfer system which partly (fully) replaces national systems and 
second, an  EMU-wide system of fiscal equalization. Our study builds on Bargain et al. (2013) which is the 
first paper that analyzes the economic implications of a European fiscal union using household micro data. 
Their analysis is based on data from 2001 and includes 11 founding members of the EA. In this paper, we 
extend the sample to the current 17 EA member states and use representative household micro data from 
2007, i.e. the year before the start of the Great Recession. Moreover, we calibrate the size of the EMU tax-
transfer system and fiscal equalization system such that transfers across countries are comparable to 
operating budgetary balances of the EU budget. We follow Bargain et al. (2013) and use the European tax 
benefit calculator EUROMOD which enables us to calculate taxes, transfers and disposable income for each 
household in a comparable way across countries. The main feature of EUROMOD is the possibility to run 
counterfactual simulations such that policy reforms and their effects on tax revenues and the income 
distribution can be analyzed. We proceed as follows. First, we construct a joint tax and transfer system for 
                                                          
1 In the following we equivalently use “EA”, “EMU” and “Eurozone” to refer to the current 17 member states of the 
European currency union and thus, only to those EMU members who have already introduced the Euro. 
2 ‘Towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, Interim Report, The President of the European Council, Brussels, 
12 October 2012, p. 4.  
3 László Andor: ‘A strong employment agenda – the pathway to economic recovery’, dinner speech at the Conference 
“Jobs for Europe: The Employment Policy Conference”, Brussels, 6 September 2012, European Commission, 
SPEECH/12/588.  
4 For a more comprehensive and historical literature review, see the predecessor paper, Bargain et al. (2013). 
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the EA which can be interpreted as an average of the national tax and transfer systems. This leads to revenue 
neutrality of the reform at the EMU level, but redistributes income across households in different member 
states. Second, we use this estimated average system to construct a fiscal equalization scheme which 
redistributes tax revenue across countries based on differences in taxing capacities. The mechanisms are 
introduced such that 10 per cent of the overall tax and transfer system are set up at the EMU level (i.e. the 
national tax-transfer systems account for 90 per cent) and 10 per cent of the differences in taxing capacities 
are equalized, respectively. This leads to rather moderate transfers of disposable income/tax revenue across 
member states which are comparable to today’s net contributions to the EU budget. Our method allows us to 
compare this to the benchmark case of full fiscal integration in both scenarios. 
Our main results are as follows. Concerning the first simulation experiment, our analysis shows that the  
introduction of an EMU-wide tax and transfer system would especially redistribute income towards 
households in the Eastern European member countries, with gains up to 6 and 7 per cent of monthly 
disposable income for median voters in Estonia and Slovakia, respectively. The largest contributors (in 
relative terms) are Ireland and Luxembourg, where median incomes fall by around 2,5 per cent. Further 
recipient countries are in Southern Europe (e.g. Portugal), yet, with far more modest changes in incomes. 
Overall, a slight majority of countries’ median voters would benefit from this reform. At the same time, 
harmonizing tax-transfer systems in the EMU would reduce income inequality overall as well as in a majority 
of the member countries. In order to analyze the stabilizing impact of this reform, we simulate a proportional 
shock on gross income (following Dolls et al. 2012) and find that the introduction of a tax and transfer 
system for the EA with an overall share of 10 per cent would only slightly affect automatic stabilization. Yet, 
small increases can be observed in particular for some Southern European countries such as Cyprus, Greece, 
or Malta. Assuming that the individual countries have completely lost access to capital markets and are thus 
not able to provide national stabilization, the EMU system cushions the income shock to an extent of 4-5 per 
cent (under the assumption that the EMU budget can be financed by issuing debt). Of course, the size of this 
effect substantially increases when considering a scenario with full integration. Yet, the direction of the effect 
especially depends on the progressivity of the national systems compared to the EMU average.  Overall, in 
the two latter cases, automatic stabilizers become more homogeneous across countries and only vary due to 
differences in income conditions and demographic composition. 
Our second simulation experiment considers the introduction of a fiscal equalization mechanism where 
the national tax and transfer systems are assumed to remain in place. The estimated average EMU system is 
used to determine the taxing capacity/expenditure needs of each country. The fiscal equalization mechanism 
redistributes tax revenue across countries based on the assumption that 10 per cent of the differences in 
taxing capacities are equalized. We first consider a shock in the form of a proportional decline in gross 
income by five per cent which hits Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (the ‘GIIPS’ group). In all 
other countries, income remains constant. The equalization mechanism can have – moderate – stabilizing 
effects in such a scenario when only a few countries are hit by a shock. However, we consider a second shock 
scenario that is comparable to the 2008-09 economic crisis where all EA member states experienced 
substantial income losses. In such a situation, the taxing capacity of the union as a whole decreases 
significantly and countries which are in a recession may face reduced transfers or higher contributions due to 
the shock. In our example, this effect can be observed for 8 out of 17 countries, with a loss in automatic 
stabilization of up to more than 10 per cent of the income shock. This highlights an important issue which is 
often neglected in the current policy debate: A fiscal equalization mechanism that solely focuses on inter-
regional insurance can have destabilizing effects in scenarios of a severe economic crisis.5  
The reminder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the framework for the design of a 
fiscal union together with the simulation scenarios. Section 3 introduces the micro data and the tax-benefit 
calculator EUROMOD, the estimation procedure, as well as some descriptive information. The results for the 
                                                          
5 Of course, these policy reforms would also impact on a wide range of possible behavioral margins, most importantly 
labor supply, tax evasion behavior, cross-country migration or administrative adaption. For a discussion of these issues, 
we refer to Bargain et al. (2013), who also explicitly account for labor supply adjustments in their analysis. 
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EMU-wide tax and transfer system and fiscal equalization mechanism are presented in sections 4 and 5. 
Section 6 compares the main results of this paper with those of its predecessor paper, Bargain et al. (2013). 
Section 7 concludes. 
  
2. Conceptual framework 
 
Generally, different concepts of a ‘fiscal union’ are possible and options discussed include fiscal rules for the 
member states for policy coordination and supervision, crisis resolution mechanisms (such as the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) or the ECB Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) program) and a European 
fiscal capacity in form of a macroeconomic shock absorption mechanism or an EMU-wide unemployment 
insurance system (see e.g. Bordo et al. 2011, Fuest and Peichl 2012). The latter element would be a clear step 
towards an integration (of elements) of the member states’ tax and transfers systems. Even if not being on the 
political agenda in the foreseeable future, a fully integrated fiscal union complementing the European 
currency union can be seen as a final step of economic integration in Europe and its analysis will provide 
important insights in general issues of deeper fiscal integration,. In this paper, we focus on an institutional 
setting in which 10 per cent of national tax-benefit systems are replaced by an harmonized EMU system. In 
addition, our method easily allows extending the simulation to full integration, i.e. where the integrated 
system replaces national institutions by 100 per cent.  In order to simplify the exposition in this section, we 
thus define a fiscal union as a complete integration of its member states’ tax and transfer systems or as a 
fiscal equalization mechanism that fully equalizes differences in taxing capacities across countries. A 
“partly” integrated system will then only be a weighted average of the supra-national and the national 
institution for each country. 
EMU tax-transfer system. Consider first how taxes and transfers at the level of the member countries 
are derived. In each country, gross market income ௜ܺ of household i is defined as the sum of all incomes from 
market activities: 
 
௜ܺ ൌ ܧ௜ ൅ ܳ௜ ൅ ܫ௜ ൅ ௜ܲ ൅ ௜ܱ ൅ ܵܫܥܧܴ௜,      (1) 
 
where ܧ௜ is labor, ܳ௜ business, ܫ௜ capital, ௜ܲ property, and ௜ܱ other income. We also assume that employer 
social insurance contributions ܵܫܥܧܴ௜	are borne by the employee. Disposable income ௜ܻ is defined as market 
income minus net government intervention ௜ܶ ൌ ܶܣ ௜ܺ ൅ ܵܫܥ௜ െ ܤܧ ௜ܰ: 
 
௜ܻ ൌ ௜ܺ െ ௜ܶ ൌ ௜ܺ െ ሺܶܣ ௜ܺ ൅ ܵܫܥ௜ െ ܤܧ ௜ܰሻ,      (2) 
 
where ܶܣ ௜ܺ are income taxes, ܵܫܥ௜ ൌ ܵܫܥܧܴ௜ ൅ ܵܫܥܧܧ௜ is the sum of employer and employee (ܵܫܥܧܧ௜) 
social insurance contributions, and ܤܧ ௜ܰ are cash benefits (i.e. negative taxes). In the following, we refer to 
the difference between taxes and social insurance contributions paid and transfers received, ௜ܶ, as ‘net taxes’. 
Household disposable income will be determined by country specific net tax schedules 
 
௜ܶ,௞ ൌ ௞݂ሺ ௜ܺ, ࢠ࢏ሻ,         (3) 
 
where ࢠ࢏ is a vector of all demographic characteristics relevant for taxation, such as marital status, age or 
number of children and ௞݂ሺ ௜ܺ , ࢠ࢏ሻ	is a function that transforms market income ௜ܺ into disposable income ௜ܻ,௞  
(which might be non-linear). 
Now, we assume that countries k=1,...,K introduce a common tax and transfer system denoted ௜ܶ,ா௎ ൌ
ா݂௎ሺ ௜ܺ, ܢ࢏ሻ, (with subscript EU denoting the fiscal union). An important precondition for its implementation 
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is that the reform will be performed in a revenue neutral way at the overall level. Thus, we assume that this 
tax system is constructed such that, for the union as a whole and given market incomes, it generates the same 
net tax revenue as the national tax systems in sum do. The easiest way to introduce a revenue neutral 
common tax system by construction is to use the “average” system over all participating countries, i.e. 
 
௜ܶ,ா௎ ൌ ா݂௎ሺ ௜ܺ, ࢠ࢏ሻ ൌ ଵ௄ ∑ ௞݂ሺ ௜ܺ, ࢠ࢏ሻ௄௞ୀଵ .      (4) 
 
Taking the average of the national systems is certainly a specific assumption in constructing a fiscal union 
and can be debated. However, we argue that as a first step, it appears to be a natural approach since the 
national tax systems enter the joint system with the weight of its respective population. Then, the more 
similar (different) the national tax systems are, the less (more) pronounced will be the “averaging” effect. As 
shown by Bargain et al. (2013), it is then very straightforward to alter the design of the common system by, 
for instance, changing its progressivity into the direction of a certain group of countries while compromising 
on the tax-transfer design of the remaining member states. In the present paper, we do not alter the average 
system but rather provide a first point of reference without entering the debate about generally increasing or 
decreasing the size of the government nor the debate about which specific tax-transfer design among 
different countries should be favored. 
One remark has to be made with respect to effects on overall tax revenue and national budgets. As 
mentioned above, we assume that the fiscal union will be introduced in a revenue neutral way at the overall 
level. However, this generally implies non-revenue neutrality at the national level. The reason is that the 
integrated system collects revenue from all citizens in the participating countries and we assume that this 
revenue goes to a common budget. Thus, the member states lose their tax revenue. We therefore have to 
make an important further assumption, which is, that the net revenue now available at the union level is 
redistributed to the member states after the implementation of the reform such that each national government 
is fully compensated for the loss in its initial net revenue. The main reason for this assumption is that national 
expenditures on public goods and services, as well as revenue from other tax sources at the national level and 
national public deficits should be unaffected by the reform. As we do not consider any behavioral 
adjustments to the tax reform, the revenue collected at the union level will be sufficient to compensate the 
governments of the member states for their net revenue losses. In sum, what essentially changes are the 
revenues from direct taxes and the expenses for cash transfers, collected from and paid to the households 
within the single countries, affecting their net tax burdens, while all revenues and expenditures outside the 
direct tax and (cash) transfer system are kept constant. In other words, redistribution is performed between 
households in terms of disposable income, not between countries in terms of revenues. 
EMU fiscal equalization mechanism. The situation is different when introducing a fiscal equalization 
mechanism for countries k=1,...,K. Here, we assume national tax and transfer systems to be unaffected but 
that tax revenue is redistributed between the member states as in most existing fiscal equalization schemes 
which are typical for federal states. We take the net revenue from the (hypothetical) EMU average tax and 
transfer system as an indicator for the taxing capacity of individual member states. Member states in which 
this indicator is below (above) the EMU average will be recipients (contributors) from (to) the fiscal 
equalization mechanism.  
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1 Data: EU-SILC and EUROMOD 
 
We use EUROMOD as a basis for our analysis. EUROMOD is a static tax-benefit calculator for the EU 
countries which allows for comparative analysis of tax-benefit systems and their impact on the income 
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distribution in a consistent way through a common framework. EUROMOD input-data are mainly based on 
the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) released by Eurostat.  
The simulated components include most direct taxes (especially income taxes on all sources of income 
including tax credits, payroll taxes and social insurance contributions) and benefits (e.g. welfare benefits, 
social assistance and some transfers based on previous contributions, e.g. unemployment benefits). 
Information on consumption is missing in the data; hence indirect taxes and taxes on corporate profits are not 
included in the model, likewise in-kind benefits. Clearly, these elements differ between countries and would 
affect the results presented. However, with view to an integration of tax-transfer policies across EMU 
member states, one can argue that also existing fiscal unions do not cover all taxes and transfers at the federal 
level. Also, EUROMOD assumes full benefit take-up and tax compliance focusing on the intended effects of 
tax-benefit systems.  
The main stages of the simulations are as follows. First, a representative micro-data sample of 
households (including information on all gross income components as well as demographic characteristics 
that are relevant to determine taxes and benefits) and the respective tax benefit rules are read into the model. 
Subsequently, the model constructs corresponding assessment units (for instance the individual or household) 
for each tax and benefit instrument according to the underlying eligibility rules. On that basis, all taxes and 
benefits are simulated and disposable income is calculated.  
In this paper, we use the EU-SILC wave of 2008, covering information for 2007, i.e. income data from 
the year before the crisis, and apply 2007 tax-transfer rules. While simulations are usually carried out for 
counterfactual situations, EUROMOD also simulates various taxes and transfers for the baseline that are not 
observed in the original data. For our purpose, we use the original data provided by EUROMOD 
complemented by those simulated components. For more detailed information on the current version of 
EUROMOD and the underlying input data, see Sutherland and Figari (2013). In the next section, we explain 
how the EUROMOD data and model is used to construct an integrated EU-wide tax-benefit model. 
 
3.2 Tax-transfer integration 
 
The simulation of an EMU tax-benefit system, as introduced in Section 2, proceeds in three steps. First, we 
use EUROMOD to extract net taxes for each individual (and household) i in representative samples for each 
country k. In particular, EUROMOD simulates the country-specific net taxes (income and payroll taxes 
minus benefits) ௜ܶ,௞ ൌ ௞݂ሺ ௜ܺ, ܢ࢏ሻ as a function of gross market income ௜ܺ and a vector of non-income factors 
ܢ࢏ taken from the data. 
Second, using those simulated net taxes ௜ܶ,௞, we obtain the “average EMU tax function” ௜ܶ,ா௎ so that it 
yields the same net revenue at the EMU level as the national systems in sum do. In order to calculate this 
average system, we adopt an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression approach and estimate the following 
reduced form tax function on the pooled sample:  
௜ܶ,௞ ൌ ߱௜ ா݂௎ሺ ௜ܺ, ܢ࢏ሻ ൅ ߝ௜.      (5) 
Function ா݂௎ is specified as a transformation of ሺ ௜ܺ, ܢ࢏ሻ → ௜ܶ,௞. ߝ௜ is the OLS residual and ߱௜ the household 
sample weight. We use a flexible functional form with higher order polynomials and interaction terms of 
income and all relevant characteristics observed in the data for the assignment of taxes and benefits (such as 
gross income from various sources, household size, age and number of children and old people, marital 
status, characteristics determining eligibility for certain benefits and pensions, homeownership etc.). Given 
that weights sum up to the EMU population size, this function directly accounts for a population weighted 
average tax function at the EMU level. Third, the estimated function is subsequently used to predict net tax 
payments for the EMU average tax system ௜ܶ,ா௎ for each household in the sample. In Section 4, net taxes to 
be paid by each household are then calculated as a weighted average of national and EMU average net taxes: 
௜ܶ ൌ α ௜ܶ,ா௎ ൅ ሺ1െ∝ሻ ௜ܶ,௞; 	α ∈ ሼ0.1,1ሽ.    (6) 
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3.3 Descriptive information 
 
In this section we report descriptive information on the variables used in our simulation exercise as well as 
for the estimated tax-benefit scenarios. We report values of these variables at the overall EMU level and for 
individual countries in Table 1. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 show the average monthly gross and disposable incomes per household, 
respectively (population shares in the first column). Columns 4 to 6 include initial gross taxes, (employee and 
employer) social insurance contributions (SIC) and benefits. Column 7 reports initial net taxes, namely 
income taxes plus SIC paid minus cash benefits received. The final column reports net taxes emerging under 
the EMU average system. Note that by construction, the EMU system leads to the same net tax revenue as 
the sum of the national systems. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 reveals considerable differences across individual countries with respect to income levels. 
Average monthly gross income ranges from 6479 Euros in Luxembourg, 169 per cent of the EMU average of 
3829 Euros, to a value of 1266 Euros in Slovakia, just 33 per cent of the EMU average. However, one should 
note that these income levels are not adjusted for differences in purchasing power, which would render 
income differentials somewhat smaller. Initial net taxes also differ considerably, between 1536 Euros in the 
Netherlands and 300 Euros in Malta. Net taxes would change significantly if the EMU average system 
completely replaced the national systems. They would increase to 2522 Euros in Luxembourg while the 
countries with the largest net transfers would now be Slovakia (273 Euros) and Estonia (31 Euros). This is 
plausible because these countries have the lowest gross income levels.  
 
4. Economic effects of an integrated EMU tax-transfer system 
 
In this section we present the key results of our first simulated policy scenario, the introduction of an EMU-
wide tax and transfer system that replaces 10 per cent of national systems. Section 4.1 focuses on 
redistributive effects while section 4.2 analyzes the potential of the EMU average tax system to act as an 
automatic fiscal stabilizer in presence of a proportional income shock.  
 
4.1 Income redistribution 
 
As outlined above, we analyze redistributive effects if 10 per cent of national tax and transfer systems are 
replaced by the harmonized EMU system. This corresponds to an average of 3 per cent of net EMU taxes 
relative to average household gross income (cp. Table 2, column 9) or 1.6 per cent relative to EMU GDP, a 
value close to the size of the EU budget which currently accounts for around 1 per cent of overall EU GDP.  
How does the 10%-introduction of the common tax and transfer system redistribute income between 
households and affects inequality in Europe? Table 2 summarizes information on changes in median 
disposable income and the Gini coefficient. The median households in Ireland (-2,4 per cent) and 
Luxembourg (-2,5 per cent) would bear the largest losses whereas the highest gains would occur in Slovakia 
(+7,3 per cent) and Estonia (+5,9 per cent). In general, countries with median household incomes clearly 
above (below) the EMU average lose (gain) from the introduction of the common tax and transfer system. 
This is illustrated in Figure 1 showing the net tax functions for the national and the EMU average tax and 
transfer system. Compare the two countries with the largest relative changes in disposable income. While 
households in Slovakia would gain from sharing a joint tax and transfer system with richer countries 
(illustrated by the national net tax function being constantly above the EMU average function), the opposite 
is true for Irish households. Yet, most of the countries are only marginally affected, with changes in median 
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income below 1 per cent. This is due to the relatively modest extent of transfers across households with the 
10%-integrated system, as shown in columns (7) and (8) (both equal 0 at the overall level by construction). 
Table A.1 in the appendix shows that these effects would become much more substantial for the case of full 
integration. In addition, Tables 2 and Table A.1 reveal that countries whose median household incomes are 
close to the EMU average might be very ambiguously affected now. This can be explained by the 
heterogeneity of national tax and transfer systems. Median households in Austria and Belgium, for instance, 
have similar disposable incomes, but while the median household in Austria loses, the median household in 
Belgium is almost not affected. Another interesting example is a comparison of Greece and Italy. In Greece 
(Italy), median disposable income is below (above) the EMU average, but the median household in Greece 
(Italy) loses (gains) from the introduction of the average EMU tax and transfer system. This 
(counterintuitive) result can again be illustrated by a comparison of the net tax functions of Greece and Italy 
(Figure 1). The EMU average is more (less) progressive than the Greek (Italian) system which leads to 
income losses (gains) for households with gross incomes above a certain income level.  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Column (6) of Table 2 shows that inequality in the EMU as a whole declines while inequality changes in 
EMU member countries differ substantially. The largest inequality reduction can be observed in Estonia and 
Slovakia (-5 per cent). The EMU average net tax function is constantly below the national function (Figure 1) 
and lower income households gain more (both in absolute and relative terms) from the introduction of the 
common tax and transfer system than higher income households. Malta is another example where inequality 
would decrease (-2 per cent). As is shown in Figure 1, the EMU and the national function cross, implying 
that low income households would receive higher transfers whereas high income households would face a 
larger tax burden under the EMU average system. In Ireland, the Gini coefficient would increase by 1 per 
cent under the 10%-EMU average system. There, the EMU net tax function is constantly above the national 
function. All these findings translate into much more substantial changes for the case of full integration, as 
shown in Table A.1 in the appendix. 
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2 Automatic fiscal stabilization 
 
A key argument of proponents of enhanced fiscal integration is an increase in macroeconomic stability, both 
at the level of individual countries and the Eurozone as a whole. Automatic fiscal stabilization is associated 
with the ability of taxes and transfers to automatically stabilize disposable income and consequently 
consumption in the event of macroeconomic shocks. This relies on a simple mechanism: in the presence of a 
given negative shock to gross income, taxes decline and transfers increase, with the decline in disposable 
income being smaller than the shock to gross income. Several components of government budgets are 
affected by the macroeconomic situation in ways that operate to smooth the business cycle, with progressive 
income taxes and unemployment benefits being the most prominent example. Automatic stabilization might 
not only have effects on disposable income but also on GDP itself. If fewer taxes are collected and more 
transfers are paid in a recession, this should support private incomes and dampen adverse movements in 
aggregate demand.  
Naturally, cushioning shocks through taxes and transfers comes at the cost of an increase in the 
government budget deficit. The usual assumption is for this gap to be closed through debt financing. 
However, in the current Eurozone debt crisis, some countries have lost access to private capital markets and 
thus need outside help to close this gap. We will return to this issue further below. 
The extent to which automatic stabilizers mitigate the impact of income shocks on household demand 
essentially depends on the tax and transfer system, determining the way in which a given shock to gross 
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income translates into a change in disposable income. For instance, in the presence of a proportional income 
tax with a tax rate of 40%, a shock on gross income of 100 Euros leads to a decline in disposable income of 
60 Euros. In this case, the tax absorbs 40% of the shock to gross income. In turn, a progressive tax would 
have a stronger stabilizing effect (van den Noord 2000, Girouard and André 2005).  
A common measure for estimating automatic stabilization is the “normalized tax change” used by 
Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) which can be interpreted as “the tax system’s built-in flexibility” (Pechman 
1973, 1987). Based on this idea, Dolls et al. (2012) define the “income stabilization coefficient”, ߬, that 
shows how changes in market income ܺ (defined as the sum of all incomes from market activities such as 
(self)-employment, business and property income) 	translate into changes in disposable income ܻ	 (market 
income minus taxes plus benefits) through changes in net tax payments T. They extend the concept of 
normalized tax change to include other taxes as well as SIC and transfers. We follow their approach, taking 
into account personal income taxes (at all government levels), SIC as well as payroll taxes and transfers to 
private households, such as unemployment benefits. ߬ is computed using arithmetic changes in total 
disposable income (∑ ∆ ௜ܻ௜ ) and market income (∑ ∆ ௜ܺ௜ ) based on household micro level information: 
߬ ൌ 1 െ	∑ ∆௒೔೔∑ ∆௑೔೔ ൌ
∑ ሺ∆௑೔ ି∆௒೔ ሻ೔
∑ ∆௑೔೔
.     (7) 
In order to compute the income stabilization coefficient, we simulate a proportional shock to gross 
income of 5% for all households. Note that automatic stabilization is a static concept and does not imply any 
(macro- or microeconomic) feedback mechanism. Results are presented in Table 3, with income stabilization 
coefficients for the national (see also Dolls et al. 2012) and the EMU average system. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE  
 
How does the 10%-EMU tax-benefit system cushion shocks in individual countries? It is not surprising that 
such a modest level of integration only slightly affects overall automatic stabilization, which is mostly 
provided by national systems (Table 3, column 2). Yet, given the experience of the recent recession, it is 
especially important to take a scenario into account in which an individual country loses access to the credit 
market. In this case, it cannot let the national stabilizers work and would have to adjust taxes or expenditures 
to keep the budget balanced. In such a scenario, the credit-constrained country would benefit from an EMU 
tax and transfer system in terms of automatic stabilization under the assumption that the EMU budget deficit 
can be financed by issuing debt. In the given 10%-scenario, this leads to income stabilization coefficients 
around 5 per cent for all countries, which are now very similar as they can only differ due to differences in 
income levels or demographic composition, but not due to the tax-transfer system (column 3). The same is 
true for the benchmark case of full fiscal integration as shown in Table A.2 in the appendix. Yet, the 
differences to the national stabilizers are much more pronounced and 9 (7) countries would experience a 
strengthening (weakening) of automatic stabilizers when completely moving from the national to the average 
EMU system, with highest gains in Cyprus, Greece and Malta. Germany is the only country whose automatic 
stabilizers would not be affected by the reform. In sum, these results show that the level of integration would 
need to be sufficiently high in order to provide significant improvement in automatic stabilization.  
 
5. Economic effects of an EMU fiscal equalization mechanism 
 
In this section, we analyze a system of fiscal equalization based on differences in taxing capacity across 
countries in the Eurozone, calculating transfers between countries that would be generated by this mechanism 
and considering two variants of a negative macroeconomic shock. We first calculate the extent to which a 
fiscal equalization mechanism would provide insurance against a shock specific to a subset of countries (the 
‘GIIPS’ group), and second, a shock comparable to the 2008-09 recession. 
More precisely, the simulation experiment is set up as follows. The fiscal equalization system we consider 
leaves the national tax and transfer systems in place yet redistributes tax revenue across countries. This 
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redistribution is based on the hypothetical ability of a country to generate tax revenue and its expenditure 
needs, which we refer to in the following as its (net) taxing capacity. Basing fiscal equalization on indicators 
of tax revenue and expenditure needs is a common approach in existing federations (see e.g. Boadway, 2004; 
Büttner, 2006). We define the taxing capacity of a country as the net tax revenue the country would raise 
from its households if fully applying the EMU average tax and transfer system considered in Section 4. This 
taxing capacity can be interpreted as an indicator of the amount of net tax revenue raised by a country if tax 
rates and transfers were set as in other countries, and serves as the basis for equalization payments: countries 
above (below) the average taxable capacity will pay (receive) transfers to (from) the equalization mechanism.  
This setup can be interpreted as a simple version of a European ‘transfer union’. In line with our first 
simulation experiment, we also focus on a fiscal equalization system compensating for 10 per cent of the 
differences in taxing capacities. This corresponds to rather modest changes in tax revenue, up to 9 per cent 
(Slovakia) of average household gross income (Tables 4 and 5, column 11). In the appendix, we compare this 
scenario to the benchmark case of a fiscal equalization system that fully compensates for differences in 
taxing capacity. One remark has to be made with respect to how these payments affect the distribution of 
taxes and transfers within a country, which is less straightforward. For simplicity we assume that the 
equalization payments are shared equally among households, i.e. households receive a (positive or negative) 
lump-sum transfer. Note that this assumption is not crucial for the stabilization effects we focus on. The 
question here is only whether a country as a whole receives more or less money from the equalization system 
after being hit by a shock. If it receives more, it can let its own automatic stabilizers work.  
Table 4 shows the average household net tax payments by country in the baseline as well as for the EMU 
average system, which serves as our measure of taxing capacity. The resulting 10%-fiscal equalization 
payments are reported in column 3 (a positive (negative) value indicates a net contributing (receiving) 
country), while column 4 includes the new distribution of net taxes. 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Consider first the direct cross country distributional effect of the fiscal equalization system. As expected, 
the high income countries are net contributors to the system with average contributions per household and 
month ranging from 120 Euros in the case of Luxembourg to 9 Euros in France. Accordingly, the countries 
with below average taxing capacity receive transfers including Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Malta, 
Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain. In Slovakia and Estonia, the fiscal equalization payments amount to 
more than 100 Euros.  
What are the implications of this system for automatic stabilizers? Consider an asymmetric shock in the 
form of a decline in gross incomes by 5% hitting the periphery of the Eurozone, i.e. the ‘GIIPS’ countries, 
which corresponds to a 2% shock at the aggregate EMU level (column 5). The shock leads to a reduction in 
the net tax payments collected in the affected countries (column 6), as well as a reduction in their taxing 
capacity (column 7). Consequently, the fiscal equalization payments have to be adjusted for all countries 
(column 8), resulting in a new distribution of net taxes (column 9). Finally, column 10 reports the automatic 
stabilization effect of the fiscal equalization scheme in the affected countries measuring the change in fiscal 
equalization payments as a percentage of the change in income caused by the shock. The positive values 
indicate that the affected countries receive higher equalization payments after the shock, i.e. the fiscal 
equalization mechanism exerts a stabilizing effect. While this effect is moderate in the given scenario, the 
comparison to Table A.3 in the appendix shows that a full compensation of differences in taxing capacities 
would have rather extreme implications, yet, preserving the qualitative findings in Table 4. 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Next, we consider a severe shock scenario, such as the recent economic crisis. To illustrate this, we take the 
observed reduction in GDP for all 17 countries under analysis from 2008 to 2009 (4 per cent on average) in 
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order to adjust gross incomes. All countries experienced a substantial reduction in GDP during that period, 
ranging from 2 to 14 per cent. In such a situation, the average taxing capacity substantially declines at the 
EMU level, from 1191 Euros per household before to 1085 Euros per household after the shock. Fiscal 
equalization contributions increase for the contributing countries Belgium and France and decrease for the 
recipient countries Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain.  Consequently, all of these countries 
experience a destabilizing effect. This effect is most pronounced for Malta and Slovakia, where payments 
received from the scheme fall by 13 per cent of the income shock. Why do we find a destabilizing effect for 
some countries in this scenario? The reason is that the shock has two effects. Firstly, the taxing capacity of 
the countries affected by the shock declines which, all other things being equal, increases (decreases) 
equalization payments for recipients (contributors). Secondly, since other countries are also affected by the 
shock, the overall taxing capacity within the union declines as well. This second effect works in the opposite 
direction of the first one. For those countries whose gross income shock is relatively small compared to the 
EMU average, the latter effect dominates the former which leads to a destabilizing effect. As above, these 
effects are substantially larger when considering the case of full equalization in Table A.4 in the appendix, 
leading to extreme destabilizing effects for Malta and Slovakia of even more than 100 per cent. 
 
6. Discussion of results 
 
How do our results differ from those presented in the predecessor paper Bargain et al. (2013)? Most 
importantly, we have extended the sample from the 11 founding members of EMU to the current 17 member 
states and have used more recent income data from 2007, the year before the start of the crisis. Moreover, we 
have calibrated the size of the EMU tax-transfer system and fiscal equalization system such that transfers 
across countries are comparable to operating budgetary balances of the EU budget. This necessarily affects 
the design of the average EMU tax and transfer system and its redistributive effects. However, the general 
factors driving redistribution across households, namely the level of the net tax burden in a country relative to 
the EMU average, the income level and changes in labor supply, have not changed. In this paper, we have 
focused on the first two factors and abstracted from the latter as labor supply adjustments only marginally 
changed the direct impact of the reforms considered in Bargain et al. (2013). While households in Greece and 
Portugal would experience largest income gains if only the 11 founding member states shared a joint tax and 
transfer system, this pattern changes under a joint system for the 17 EA member states with households in 
Slovakia and Estonia as the main profiteers. This is not surprising given that average incomes in these 
countries are much lower than in Southern Europe. For the fiscal equalization mechanism, our results are also 
in line with those in Bargain et al. (2013) with the exception that we do not find a destabilizing effect for 
Greece in the scenario where only the ‘GIIPS’ countries are hit by a shock. In our case, the effect of the 
growing gap between the taxing capacity in the affected countries and the EMU average dominates the effect 
of a declining taxing capacity in the union as a whole which can be explained by the fact that the new 
member states in Eastern Europe have rather low taxing capacities. 
Our results should be interpreted in the light of the limitations of our analysis, and also the simplifying 
assumptions made. Our analysis abstracts from a number of behavioral effects. In particular, we do not 
account for labor supply reactions, tax evasion and avoidance or income shifting. If one assumes that tax 
evasion is higher in countries with lower incomes, our simulations would underscore the degree of 
redistribution from high to low income countries caused by the introduction of a common tax system. In 
addition, we have abstracted from potential effects of fiscal integration on cross country migration. For 
instance, more generous transfers to households in poor countries or countries affected by macroeconomic 
shocks could prevent their migration to other countries if they are unemployed. Among other things, this 
would make adjustments to asymmetric shocks more difficult. 
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7. Conclusion 
 
The current debt crisis in the Eurozone has brought the idea of deeper fiscal integration to the top of the 
European policy agenda. In this paper, we have re-assessed the economic effects of two main options for 
fiscal integration: i) the introduction of an harmonized EMU tax and transfer system that replaces the existing 
national systems by 10 per cent; and ii) the introduction of a fiscal equalization mechanism that compensates 
for 10 per cent of the differences in taxing capacities across countries.. 
With respect to redistributive concerns, our analysis shows that introducing a 10%-EMU tax and 
transfer system would lead to moderate redistribution between countries. In particular households in Eastern 
and some Southern European countries would gain from sharing a joint tax and transfer system with other 
Eurozone countries while households in Ireland and Luxembourg would suffer the largest income losses. A 
key motivation of introducing an EMU tax-benefit system could be an increase in automatic fiscal 
stabilization in the different member countries. Yet, our analysis shows that automatic stabilizers would only 
marginally be strengthened in a majority of EMU countries.  
Regarding the system of fiscal equalization, we consider a scheme that neutralizes the difference 
between the taxing capacity of an individual country and the average EMU taxing capacity by 10 per cent. 
Unsurprisingly, this system leads to a transfer of tax revenue from high to low income countries. However, 
the achievements are disappointing in terms of income stabilization in the presence of shocks hitting all 
member states with the fiscal equalization mechanism having a destabilizing effect for some countries. An 
important policy implication of this analysis is the necessity of distinguishing between the redistributive 
effects of fiscal integration and its stabilization effects in the presence of macroeconomic shocks. 
To summarize, our analysis highlights that further fiscal integration could indeed improve fiscal stabilizers 
in the Eurozone and reduce the vulnerability of individual member states to income shocks somewhat. Yet, it 
seems that this can only be achieved with much higher levels of fiscal integration than considered in our main 
scenarios, implying also more income redistribution across countries. Thus, it seems unlikely that such 
reforms will find political support, suggesting that fiscal institutions of existing federations, which typically 
combine redistributive and stabilizing effects, may not be the way forward for Europe. Instead, it may be 
necessary to explore ways of improving macroeconomic stability ideally without redistributing income ex 
ante. Rather than copying fiscal institutions of existing federations, Europe seems to need new concepts to 
make deeper fiscal integration politically feasible.  
This paper points to various opportunities for future research. Firstly, it would be interesting to study 
particular aspects of a common tax and transfer system, such as a common unemployment insurance system, 
as recently suggested by EU Commissioner Andor. Secondly, our finding that a fiscal stabilization 
mechanism may have destabilizing effects in the event of an asymmetric shock suggests that other designs 
for a ‘fiscal capacity’ that provide such insurance are needed and should be studied. One possible design 
would be a system where grants are only provided to countries if they are actually hit by a shock, i.e. such a 
system would only grant transfers to countries in times of crisis. Thirdly, it would be desirable to quantify the 
potential welfare benefits of improved insurance and stabilization through fiscal integration compared to its 
redistributive effects. This would require the introduction of some notion of risk aversion into the analysis, 
which raises a number of interesting challenges (cf. Neumann 2013). Finally, our analysis has taken the 
policies of the member states as given. However, one can expect the member states to adjust their fiscal 
policies as a reaction to fiscal integration, which is important to take into account from a political economy 
perspective on deeper integration in Europe. We intend to pursue these issues in future research. 
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Figures and Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 National tax-benefit schemes compared to EMU average system Note: Based on country means for 
gross income ventiles; monthly thousand 2007 EUR. Sources: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD. 
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Table 1 Average monthly household income and taxes (2007 EUR) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
EMU 1.000 3829 2625 543 1107 446 1204 1204 
AT 0.027 4349 3058 593 1293 594 1291 1464 
BE 0.033 4309 2822 861 1143 516 1487 1375 
CY 0.002 3598 3264 238 488 392 334 959 
DE 0.279 4026 2673 666 1112 424 1353 1367 
EE 0.004 1419 975 179 369 104 444 -31 
EL 0.030 2675 2138 294 577 334 537 631 
ES 0.129 3245 2397 311 851 313 849 940 
FI 0.018 4260 2854 938 1001 533 1405 1359 
FR 0.188 3994 2610 410 1462 487 1384 1318 
IE 0.012 4872 4422 744 635 929 450 1462 
IT 0.173 3951 2714 664 1128 555 1237 1146 
LU 0.001 6479 5105 794 1426 847 1373 2522 
MT 0.001 2245 1944 200 344 244 300 299 
NL 0.054 4660 3125 634 1274 372 1536 1694 
PT 0.028 2385 1824 243 609 291 561 496 
SI 0.005 2587 1942 261 790 406 645 323 
SK 0.014 1266 933 69 429 164 333 -273 
Note: (1) Population share; (2) gross income; (3) disposable income; (4) gross taxes; (5) gross SIC; (6) gross benefits; (7) 
net taxes baseline; (8) net taxes EMU average. Sources: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD. 
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Table 2  Disposable income and income inequality - 10% EMU average system 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
EMU 2298 2297 -0.1 0.326 0.326 -0.3 0 0.0 3.1 
AT 2634 2613 -0.8 0.318 0.318 0.2 -17 -0.4 3.4 
BE 2609 2613 0.2 0.301 0.302 0.5 11 0.3 3.2 
CY 2942 2897 -1.5 0.284 0.281 -1.1 -63 -1.7 2.7 
DE 2301 2302 0.1 0.328 0.327 -0.1 -1 0.0 3.4 
EE 855 906 5.9 0.347 0.33 -5.0 48 3.3 -0.2 
EL 1849 1848 0.0 0.347 0.344 -0.7 -9 -0.4 2.4 
ES 2173 2164 -0.4 0.295 0.294 -0.5 -9 -0.3 2.9 
FI 2581 2580 -0.1 0.318 0.319 0.3 5 0.1 3.2 
FR 2355 2366 0.5 0.299 0.299 -0.1 7 0.2 3.3 
IE 3961 3865 -2.4 0.312 0.315 0.9 -101 -2.1 3.0 
IT 2426 2429 0.1 0.314 0.315 0.4 9 0.2 2.9 
LU 4643 4525 -2.5 0.282 0.284 0.7 -115 -1.8 3.9 
MT 1767 1766 -0.1 0.293 0.287 -2.2 0 0.0 1.3 
NL 2846 2826 -0.7 0.33 0.331 0.2 -16 -0.3 3.6 
PT 1480 1492 0.8 0.351 0.347 -1.2 7 0.3 2.1 
SI 1817 1848 1.7 0.282 0.278 -1.3 32 1.2 1.2 
SK 854 916 7.3 0.273 0.259 -5.1 61 4.8 -2.2 
Note: (1) Median income; (2) median income integrated system; (3) percentage change in median income; (4) Gini; (5) 
Gini integrated system; (6) percentage change in Gini; (7) average difference in household income from national to 
integrated system; (8) share of (7) in average gross income in %; (9) share of net taxes under 10%-EMU average system 
in average gross income in %; incomes in monthly 2007 EUR. Sources: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and 
EUROMOD. 
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Table 3 Income stabilization coefficients (for 5% gross income shock) - 10% EMU average system 
 (1) (2) (3) 
EMU 0.51 0.51 0.05 
AT 0.57 0.56 0.05 
BE 0.63 0.61 0.05 
CY 0.28 0.30 0.05 
DE 0.51 0.51 0.05 
EE 0.42 0.42 0.04 
EL 0.38 0.39 0.05 
ES 0.42 0.43 0.05 
FI 0.55 0.55 0.05 
FR 0.53 0.53 0.05 
IE 0.46 0.47 0.05 
IT 0.54 0.54 0.05 
LU 0.46 0.46 0.05 
MT 0.31 0.32 0.05 
NL 0.48 0.48 0.05 
PT 0.44 0.44 0.05 
SI 0.48 0.48 0.05 
SK 0.45 0.44 0.04 
Note: (1) Baseline with national systems; (2) integrated system; (3) 10% EMU average system and national credit 
constraints. Sources: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD. 
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Table 4 10%-Fiscal equalization mechanism with 5% gross income shock to ‘GIIPS’ countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
EMU 1185 1191 0 1185 -2 1141 1146 0 1141 2 0.0 
AT 1291 1379 19 1310 0 1291 1379 23 1314 0 0.4 
BE 1487 1369 18 1505 0 1487 1369 22 1509 0 0.4 
CY 334 1031 -16 318 0 334 1031 -11 323 0 -0.4 
DE 1353 1362 17 1370 0 1353 1362 22 1375 0 0.4 
EE 444 180 -101 343 0 444 180 -97 347 0 -7.1 
EL 537 751 -44 493 -5 470 669 -48 422 3 -1.6 
ES 849 993 -20 829 -5 755 889 -26 730 4 -0.6 
FI 1405 1322 13 1418 0 1406 1322 18 1424 0 0.3 
FR 1384 1284 9 1393 0 1384 1284 14 1398 0 0.2 
IE 450 1457 27 477 -5 326 1299 15 341 5 0.5 
IT 1237 1154 -4 1233 -5 1102 1025 -12 1090 4 -0.1 
LU 1373 2395 120 1493 0 1374 2395 125 1499 0 1.9 
MT 300 357 -83 217 0 301 357 -79 222 0 -3.7 
NL 1536 1587 40 1576 0 1535 1587 44 1579 0 0.8 
PT 561 554 -64 497 -5 493 484 -66 427 2 -2.7 
SI 645 495 -70 575 0 645 495 -65 580 0 -2.7 
SK 333 60 -113 220 0 333 60 -109 224 0 -8.9 
Note: Monetary values are in monthly 2007 EUR. (1) Net taxes baseline; (2) net taxes EU average; (3) fiscal equalization 
(FE); (4) FE taxes; (5) gross income shock in %; (6) net taxes national system after shock; (7) net taxes EMU average 
after shock; (8) FE after shock; (9) FE taxes after shock; (10) change in automatic stabilization in %; (11) share of (3) in 
average gross income in %. (3) = (2)–1191; (4) = (1)+(3); (8) = (7)–1146; (9) = (6)+(8). Sources: Own calculations based 
on EU-SILC and EUROMOD. 
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Table 5 10%-Fiscal equalization mechanism with 2008-2009 shock to all countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
EMU 1185 1191 0 1185 -4 1075 1082 0 1075 -1 0.0 
AT 1291 1379 19 1310 -4 1176 1270 19 1195 0 0.4 
BE 1487 1369 18 1505 -3 1397 1291 21 1418 -3 0.4 
CY 334 1031 -16 318 -2 311 989 -9 302 -10 -0.4 
DE 1353 1362 17 1370 -5 1215 1225 14 1230 1 0.4 
EE 444 180 -101 343 -14 324 76 -101 223 0 -7.1 
EL 537 751 -44 493 -3 495 699 -38 456 -7 -1.6 
ES 849 993 -20 829 -4 779 915 -17 762 -3 -0.6 
FI 1405 1322 13 1418 -9 1152 1081 0 1152 4 0.3 
FR 1384 1284 9 1393 -3 1297 1200 12 1309 -2 0.2 
IE 450 1457 27 477 -5 314 1286 20 335 2 0.5 
IT 1237 1154 -4 1233 -5 1089 1012 -7 1082 1 -0.1 
LU 1373 2395 120 1493 -4 1224 2216 113 1338 3 1.9 
MT 300 357 -83 217 -3 277 325 -76 202 -13 -3.7 
NL 1536 1587 40 1576 -4 1424 1474 39 1463 0 0.8 
PT 561 554 -64 497 -3 521 513 -57 464 -10 -2.7 
SI 645 495 -70 575 -8 521 374 -71 451 1 -2.7 
SK 333 60 -113 220 -5 296 31 -105 191 -13 -8.9 
Note: See Table 4. (8) = (7)–1082. Sources: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD. Changes in GDP 
(column 5) from IMF. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 Disposable income and income inequality - 100% EMU average system 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EMU 2298 2276 -0.9 0.289 0.282 -2.4 
AT 2634 2413 -8.4 0.253 0.267 5.6 
BE 2609 2607 -0.1 0.226 0.26 14.8 
CY 2942 2426 -17.5 0.247 0.208 -15.5 
DE 2301 2286 -0.6 0.265 0.267 0.9 
EE 855 1377 61.0 0.293 0.197 -32.8 
EL 1849 1826 -1.3 0.322 0.284 -11.7 
ES 2173 2076 -4.5 0.276 0.256 -7.4 
FI 2581 2541 -1.6 0.244 0.257 5.5 
FR 2355 2415 2.6 0.244 0.246 0.5 
IE 3961 2862 -27.7 0.265 0.31 17.0 
IT 2426 2471 1.8 0.284 0.278 -2.0 
LU 4643 3472 -25.2 0.247 0.286 15.8 
MT 1767 1786 1.1 0.264 0.225 -14.9 
NL 2846 2656 -6.7 0.264 0.267 1.3 
PT 1480 1578 6.7 0.327 0.297 -9.1 
SI 1817 2118 16.6 0.226 0.209 -7.3 
SK 854 1441 68.7 0.219 0.185 -15.3 
Note: (1) Median income; (2) median income EU average; (3) percentage change in median income; (4) Gini; (5) Gini 
EU average; (6) percentage change in Gini; incomes in monthly 2007 EUR. Sources: Own calculations based on EU-
SILC and EUROMOD. 
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Table A.2 Income stabilization coefficients (for 5% gross income shock) - 100% EMU average system 
 (1) (2) 
EMU 0.51 0.51 
AT 0.57 0.53 
BE 0.63 0.51 
CY 0.28 0.49 
DE 0.51 0.51 
EE 0.42 0.40 
EL 0.38 0.46 
ES 0.42 0.48 
FI 0.55 0.52 
FR 0.53 0.52 
IE 0.46 0.50 
IT 0.54 0.51 
LU 0.46 0.51 
MT 0.31 0.45 
NL 0.48 0.51 
PT 0.44 0.46 
SI 0.48 0.49 
SK 0.44 0.35 
Note: (1) Baseline with national systems; (2) EU average system. Sources: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and 
EUROMOD. 
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Table A.3 100%-Fiscal equalization mechanism with 5% gross income shock to ‘GIIPS’ countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EMU 1185 1191 0 1185 -2 1141 1146 0 1141 15 
AT 1291 1379 188 1479 0 1291 1379 233 1524 0 
BE 1487 1369 178 1665 0 1487 1369 223 1710 0 
CY 334 1031 -160 174 0 334 1031 -115 219 0 
DE 1353 1362 171 1524 0 1353 1362 216 1569 0 
EE 444 180 -1011 -567 0 444 180 -966 -522 0 
EL 537 751 -440 97 -5 470 669 -477 -7 27 
ES 849 993 -198 651 -5 755 889 -256 499 36 
FI 1405 1322 131 1536 0 1406 1322 176 1582 0 
FR 1384 1284 93 1477 0 1384 1284 138 1522 0 
IE 450 1457 266 716 -5 326 1299 153 479 46 
IT 1237 1154 -37 1200 -5 1102 1025 -121 981 42 
LU 1373 2395 1204 2577 0 1374 2395 1249 2623 0 
MT 300 357 -834 -534 0 301 357 -789 -488 0 
NL 1536 1587 396 1932 0 1535 1587 441 1976 0 
PT 561 554 -637 -76 -5 493 484 -662 -169 21 
SI 645 495 -696 -51 0 645 495 -651 -6 0 
SK 333 60 -1131 -798 0 333 60 -1086 -753 0 
Note: Monetary values are in monthly 2007 EUR. (1) Net taxes baseline; (2) net taxes EU average; (3) fiscal equalization 
(FE); (4) FE taxes; (5) gross income shock in %; (6) net taxes national system after shock; (7) net taxes EU average after 
shock; (8) FE after shock; (9) FE taxes after shock; (10) change in automatic stabilization in %. (3) = (2)–1191;  
(4) = (1)+(3); (8) = (7)–1146; (9) = (6)+(8). Sources: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD. 
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Table A.4 100%-Fiscal equalization mechanism with 2008-2009 shock to all countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
EMU 1185 1191 0 1185 -4 1083 1085 0 1083 -9 
AT 1291 1379 188 1479 -4 1176 1267 182 1358 4 
BE 1487 1369 178 1665 -3 1396 1289 204 1601 -22 
CY 334 1031 -160 174 -2 311 989 -97 214 -95 
DE 1353 1362 171 1524 -5 1227 1228 143 1370 14 
EE 444 180 -1011 -567 -14 312 66 -1019 -708 4 
EL 537 751 -440 97 -3 483 696 -389 94 -61 
ES 849 993 -198 651 -4 777 926 -159 618 -32 
FI 1405 1322 131 1536 -9 1184 1109 24 1207 30 
FR 1384 1284 93 1477 -3 1309 1204 119 1429 -21 
IE 450 1457 266 716 -5 298 1281 196 493 27 
IT 1237 1154 -37 1200 -5 1100 1014 -71 1029 16 
LU 1373 2395 1204 2577 -4 1206 2213 1128 2333 29 
MT 300 357 -834 -534 -3 270 322 -763 -493 -121 
NL 1536 1587 396 1932 -4 1443 1478 393 1836 2 
PT 561 554 -637 -76 -3 519 511 -574 -55 -90 
SI 645 495 -696 -51 -8 521 376 -709 -188 7 
SK 333 60 -1131 -798 -5 296 30 -1055 -759 -121 
Note: See Table A.4. (8) = (7)–1082. Sources: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EUROMOD. Changes in GDP 
(column 5) from IMF. 
 
 
 
